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## SOVIET WARNINGS ON PERIPHERAL ATOMIC BASES

- I. Moscow is hitting back hard at prospective deployment of US atomicequipped units in striking distance of Communist territory.
  - A. Reflects real apprehension over long run enhancement of US striking capabilities.
  - B. Moscow also giving heavy play to alleged aggressive implications this US move.
- II. USSR has now given public or private warnings to practically all states aligned with US that acceptance US atomic unit bases invites nuclear destruction.
  - A. 21 March note to Norway was first <u>formal</u> warning--followed by those to Denmark and UK. (Wonder when Turkey coming?)
  - B. Soviet diplomat told Haile Sclassie "USSR would be compelled to destroy" any US nuclear air bases in Ethiopia in event of war, and "then where would Ethiopia be?"

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of US atomic bases in Saudi Arabia would prejudice possibility of peace in Middle East.

- D. Soviet Ambassador formally warned Greek foreign minister on 2 April that if Greece were used as a base for atomic weapons, it would suffer devastating retaliation by this means. If it were not so used, it would not be attacked by atomic weapons.
- E. East German premier Grotewohl, on 3 April, threatened "counter-measures" against the placing of US atomic weapons

- III. Moscow has issued several warnings this year that it will retaliate against such aggressive military planning by strengthening the Warsaw pact, a counter threat designed to strengthen the Soviet quid pro quo position on withdrawal of forces from Europe.
- IV. So far, most recipient governments have been irritated rather than impressed by these Soviet threats.
  - A. Greek foreign minister Averoff told the Soviet ambassador that threats had never been a successful instrument of diplomacy in dealing with Greece and that today NATO membership provided it with the strongest defensive support it ever had.
  - B. Popular reaction may be more receptive to the Soviet attempts at intimidation and this is the main target. A Moviet

    25X1C diplomat that Moscow hopes to alarm the populations in Greece, Turkey, Iran and Japan, and thus make such atomic bases political anathems.